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Introduction: (De)democratisation in Slovenia 
and Montenegro: Comparing the Quality 
of Democracy
OLIVERA KOMAR AND META NOVAK 1
Abstract: This paper creates a framework for the comparison of two similar and yet 
different democratisation cases – Slovenia and Montenegro. The two countries have 
obvious similarities: their geography and small population, as well as their common 
socialist Yugoslav heritage and common aspirations to join international organisations, 
most importantly the European Union. However, while Slovenia went through the de‑
mocratisation process rather smoothly, Montenegro took the longer road, struggling 
for more than a decade to regain its independence and complete its transition. We 
take into account different internal and external factors in these two cases such as the 
year of independence and of joining NATO, the political and electoral system, ethnic 
homogeneity, the viability of civil society, EU integration status, economic development 
and the presence of war in each territory in order to identify and describe those factors 
that contributed to the success of democratisation in different areas: the party system, 
the interest groups system, the defence system, Europeanisation and social policy. We 
find that the democratisation process in these countries produced different results in 
terms of quality. Various objective measures of the quality of democracy score Slovenia 
higher compared to Montenegro, while public opinion data shows, in general, greater 
satisfaction with the political system and greater trust in political institutions in Mon‑
tenegro than in Slovenia.
Keywords: democratisation, democratic backsliding, post ‑socialism, quality of 
democracy
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Introduction
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, its successor states initiated 
democratization process. However, democratization occurred at a different 
pace in each country, depending on both the internal and the external context 
(Beetham 2004).
Slovenia went through the process of democratisation rather successfully 
(Rizman, 2006) due to a number of factors. First of all, it took advantage of its 
significantly better economic position compared to the other Yugoslav repub‑
lics. The advantage of Slovenia especially in its economic situation was already 
evident in the1990s and continues to be the case today. Croatia, which was the 
second ex ‑Yugoslav country to join the European Union (EU) still lags behind 
Slovenia on most economic indexes. This better economic position contributed 
to the easier transformation to free market economy and a smoother process of 
democratic transition. Its border position with Western Europe (having fron‑
tiers with both Austria and Italy) broadened the perspective of its citizens and 
their ambition to change the political system. Moreover, with its rather homo‑
geneous population, Slovenia was spared internal disputes over key strategic 
goals. As the result its accession to the international organisation community 
followed immediately after independence and occurred simultaneously with 
its democratic transition. Slovenia entered international organisations rather 
quickly, joining the United Nations in 1992, the Council of Europe in 1993, the 
European Union and NATO in 2004 and the OECD in 2010.
On the other hand, Montenegro, the smallest of the former Yugoslav re‑
publics, is one of the youngest independent countries in Europe. After the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, it did not seek full independence until 2006. In the 
1990s, it chose to followed Milosevic’s politics and stay in various different as‑
sociations with Serbia. Due to its heterogeneous population and ethnic based 
political cleavage, it did not resolve its statehood status before 2006. Even after 
independence, the cleavage has persisted in driving the political dynamic now 
disguised in other issues (for and against NATO, for and against the EU, for 
and against the independence of Kosovo, for and against the controversial law 
on the freedom of religion, and so on). In 2006, Montenegro joined United 
Nations, in 2007 it joined to the Council of Europe, and ten years later, in 
2017 Montenegro became a member of NATO. In 2012 Montenegro started the 
process of accession negotiations with the EU and currently has the status of 
an EU candidate country. Unlike Slovenia, its only external border was with 
communist Albania, a country that also experienced political change and be‑
gan its democratic transition in 1991. The economic situation of Montenegro 
was much less positive than it was in Slovenia. However, both GDP and the 
Human Development Index have been slowly increasing since 2000 and are 
the highest after Slovenia and Croatia among the former Yugoslav republics 
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(Human Development Report 2019). Additionally, Montenegro is yet to experi‑
ence a change in government. The ruling party which originated in the former 
Montenegrin Communist party has been in power ever since. Bearing in mind 
Huntington’s ‘two turnover test’ (Huntington 1991), one could even argue that 
democracy in Montenegro is yet to consolidate.
However, even after a successful democratic transition and consolidation, the 
process is never fully complete, as it continues towards establishing a higher de‑
gree of quality of democracies and increasing the legitimacy of adopted policies 
(Högström 2011). Nowadays many European countries face democratic deficits, 
as is evident from voter turnout in elections, party membership, and trust in 
political institutions and parties (Maloney 2009). Furthermore, researchers 
have shown that established democracies are facing democratic backsliding 
or de ‑democratisation processes (Bermeo 2016; Bieber Solska – Taleski 2018; 
Günay – Dzihic 2016; Levitsky – Way 2010; Öktem – Akkoyunlu 2016; Zakaria 
1997). The examples of democratic deficit and possible backslidings need to 
be taken even more into account in young democracies such as Slovenia and 
Montenegro. This article and special issue will thus focus on the case studies 
of Slovenia and Montenegro in order to see how the heritage and legacy of dif‑
ferent democratisation processes reacts to contemporary de ‑democratisation 
challenges. Montenegro and Slovenia have many common characteristics which 
enables us to “isolate” the effects of different processes and dynamics of de‑
mocratisation and evaluate how resistant the newly built systems are to current 
democratic backsliding treats.
The two countries share a recent socialist past and a specific Yugoslav soft 
self ‑governance system. They are both small in terms of population and area, 
and they both went through the process of political change in the 1990s that 
ended up in independence. In Slovenia, this process was completed rather 
swiftly while Montenegro took a longer path. In addition, both countries are 
parliamentary democracies with proportional representation.
Beyond these common characteristics, within the framework of this special 
issue, we intended to identify the factors that have contributed to the current 
level and quality of democracy in Slovenia and Montenegro and compare the 
level of quality of democracy in different areas. In this introductory article to 
the special issue, we will present the existing empirical evidence with regards 
to the current quality of democracy in the two countries and the authors of 
the papers which follow will then look in more detail at the factors that have 
contributed to the quality of democracy in different areas, as well as at the re‑
silience of the exiting political culture and structures when faced with current 
de ‑democratisation challenges.
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How do we define the quality of democracy?
During the 1990s, the majority of Central and Eastern Europe, which had ex‑
perienced communist rule, went through the process of democratic transition 
and changes to the political system. Today, the majority of Europe consists of 
democratic countries that are either currently viewed as consolidated democ‑
racies (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia), 
semi ‑consolidated democracies (Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania) or tran‑
sitional governments/hybrid regimes (Hungary, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and North Macedonia) (Nations in Transit, 
2020). Some of the countries exhibited change of the status in the last two years. 
Poland went from consolidated democracy to semi ‑consolidated democracy, 
Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro from semi ‑consolidated to transitional/hybrid 
regime (Nations in Transit, 2020). At the same time, the quality of democracy is 
being questioned in older “established” democracies as well. Trust in political 
institutions and especially political parties is dropping. The same can be said for 
levels of satisfaction with democracy, especially as a result of recent economic 
crises (Eurobarometer 2019). Scholars are thus no longer only interested in 
explaining regime transition and measuring the success of various democratic 
transitions, but also in evaluating and explaining the quality of democracy.
Measuring the quality of democracy could also be useful for political actors 
and civil society actors. After all, deepening democracy is perceived as being of 
vital importance to increasing the legitimacy of political and policy decisions 
(Diamond – Morlino 2004a). Low levels in relation to the quality of democracy, 
on the other hand, might indicate a serious democratic problem (Högström 
2011). As such, it is no surprise that we can come across various measures of 
quality of democracy (Fuchs – Roller 2018). However, this does not mean that 
the definition of the quality of democracy is universal. In fact, researchers in 
this field have not yet agreed on a single definition (Högström 2011). One of 
the most straightforward definitions is: “The term “quality” refers to the degree to 
which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, accountability, 
equality and participation.” (Lijphart 1993: 14).
While researchers agree that the quality of democracy is composed of meas‑
ure that consists of multiple dimensions, they have not all used the same di‑
mensions and indicators of democracy. As we noted, the quality of democracy 
is affected by different factors and dimensions, and some of them are closely 
dependent on the satisfaction and interests of citizens. Predominantly these 
includes the following dimensions:
1) Freedom, which includes political, civil and social rights such as the right 
to political participation, human rights and socioeconomic rights;
2) The rule of law, “the legal system [that] defends the political rights and proce‑
dures of democracy, upholds everyone’s civil rights, and reinforces the authority of 
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other agencies of horizontal accountability that ensure the legality and propriety 
of official actions” (Diamond – Morlino 2004b: 23).
3) Vertical accountability, where politicians need to justify their decisions 
before voters;
4) Responsiveness, the satisfaction of citizens with democracy as well as the 
implementation of policies that citizens support;
5) Equality, being the legal equality of all citizens regardless of their gender, 
race, ethnicity, religion, political orientation and so on;
6) Participation, where every citizen has the right to participate politically and 
is able to use this right. This includes not only voting but also the right to 
organize, assemble, protest, monitor, demanding accountability and lobby 
for your own interests;
7) Competition, being regular, free and fair multiparty electoral competition;
8) Horizontal accountability, where politicians are also answerable to other 
officials and institutions;
9) Transparency and
10) Effectiveness of representation (Diamond – Morlino 2004b).
This is of course not necessarily an exhaustive list of dimensions. Moreover, 
the above listed dimensions often overlap and depend upon one another. This 
means that improvements in one dimension thus not lead only to improvements 
in the quality of democracy in general but also in other dimensions, causing 
a multiplying effect in the improvement of the quality of democracy. Likewise, 
the regression of one dimension may lead also to regression in the other di‑
mensions. At the same time, there are also some trade ‑offs between different 
dimensions, which means that it is impossible to maximise all dimensions at 
once, for example in the opposition between freedom and responsiveness. Con‑
sequently, there is no single best state of democracy that each country should 
reach (Diamond – Morlino 2004b).
Additionally, a government may achieve high scores on all dimensions while 
the constituency may still not be satisfied with the outcomes, since it is impossi‑
ble for the government to take in consideration all possible interests (Diamond – 
Morlino 2004b). It is thus possible that objective measures of individual dimen‑
sions score highly while the subjective measures show low scores or vice ‑versa 
(Fuchs – Roller 2018). Indexes of the quality of democracy are predominantly 
based on objective measures and there are several: these include the indices 
provided by Freedom House, Polity IV, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index 
of Democracy, the Democracy Barometer, the Varieties of Democracy (V ‑Dem) 
Project and so on. (Fuchs – Roller 2018; Högström 2011). Fuchs and Roller 
(2018) argue that in order to understand the quality of democracy, subjective 
measures, including the opinions of citizens, should be taken in consideration. 
In some cases, the indexes on the quality of democracy also include subjective 
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measures such as citizens’ confidence in the legal system. However, the scores 
of subjective measures and objective measures can vary substantially (Fuchs – 
Roller 2018). The stability and functioning of democracy in the end depend 
on citizens’ support for democracy, which is composed of their support for 
democratic values and principles, democratic regimes and political authorities 
(Fuchs and Roller 2018).
The quality of democracy in Slovenia and Montenegro: 
“Objective” measures
In the next section, we will compare the quality of democracy in Slovenia and 
Montenegro by making an overview of some of the most commonly used in‑
dexes that measure quality of democracy (see Table 1). The Nations in Transit 
index measures how democratic those states that went through transition in the 
1990s are. Their democracy score is composed of seven different dimensions 
(Nations in Transit 2020):
1) National democratic governance, operationalised with a democratic and 
stable governmental system; an independent, effective and accountable 
legislature and executive branch and military and security services that are 
subject to democratic oversight.
2) The electoral process, expressed in regular, free and fair elections, fair elec‑
toral laws and equal campaigning opportunities; the absence of barriers to 
political organization and registration; a multiparty electoral system with 
opposition parties; public engagement in political life; openness to minority 
groups in political participation; opportunities for the effective rotation of 
power; free choice and free and fair judgment of both the presidential and 
legislative elections.
3) Civil society; seen in the protection of the rights of an independent civil 
society; a vibrant civil society; the absence of excessive influence from ex‑
tremist and intolerant organisations; a legal and regulatory environment 
free of excessive state pressures and bureaucracy; sufficient organizational 
capacity to work; financially viable with opportunities for fundraising and 
work; respect from the government for policy advocacy and from the media; 
the right to form and join free trade unions and an education system free 
of political influence and propaganda.
4) An independent media, operationalised with legal protection for press 
freedoms, where journalists are protected from persecution; opposition to 
onerous libel laws which are free from interference from the government 
or private owners; a diverse selection of sources of information; privately 
owned media; the financial viability of private media subject only to market 
forces; the distribution of newspapers being privately controlled; a profes‑
sional associations of journalists and free access to and use of the internet.
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5) Local democratic governance, where principles are enshrined in law and 
respected in practice; local leaders are selected via free and fair elections; 
meaningful participation of citizens in local government decision ‑making; 
the free and autonomous exercise of power; adequate resources and capac‑
ity as needed by local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities and operate 
with transparency and accountability to citizens.
6) The judicial framework and independence, by protection for fundamental 
political, civil and human rights; respect for fundamental rights in practice; 
independence and impartiality in the interpretation and enforcement of 
the constitution; equality before the law; effective reform of criminal law; 
suspects and prisoners being protected in practice against arbitrary arrest, 
detention without trial, searches without warrants, torture, abuse and ex‑
cessive delays in the criminal justice system; judges being appointed in fair 
and unbiased manner, judges ruling fairly and impartially and courts free 
of political control and influence, where authorities comply with judicial 
decisions.
7) Corruption being prevented through the implementation of effective anti‑
corruption initiatives; a country’s economy free of excessive state involve‑
ment; a government free from excessive bureaucratic regulation, regis‑
tration requirements and other barriers that increase opportunities for 
corruption; significant limitations on the participation of government 
officials in economic life; adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and 
preventing any conflict of interest; government advertisements for jobs 
and contracts; a state which enforces effective legislative and administra‑
tive process to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption on the part 
of government officials and civil servants; whistle ‑blowers, anticorruption 
activists, investigators, and journalists enjoying legal protections; any al‑
legations of corruption are given wide and extensive airing in the media 
and the public displays a high intolerance for official corruption.
Each dimension is measured by set of yes and no questions. The ratings are 
prepared by Freedom House, academic advisers and country experts. Democracy 
scores show the average of the ratings for all seven dimensions. The values range 
from one to seven, where 1 represents the lowest level of democratic progress 
and 7 the highest (Nations in Transit 2020).
Slovenia scores better than Montenegro on all dimensions and overall, al‑
though both countries received the lowest scores in the domain of corruption. 
The democratic score for Slovenia is 5.93 which ranks it among consolidated 
democracies that closely embody the best policies and practices of liberal de‑
mocracies, but which face challenges with corruption. It scores highest at the 
dimension of the electoral process and local democratic governance and lowest 
on the dimension of corruption. The highest scores in Montenegro is awarded 
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to the dimension of civil society, while as already said, the lowest is for corrup‑
tion. Overall, in 2019, the value of democratic score was 3.86, which classifies 
Montenegro as transitional/hybrid regime, being those electoral democracies 
that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders and 
in which the democratic institutions are fragile, with substantial challenges to 
the protection of political rights and civil liberties (Nations in Transit 2020).
V ‑Dem project measures democracy using a liberal democracy index that in‑
cludes liberal and electoral aspects of democracy, an electoral democracy index 
that includes indicators on suffrage, elected officials, clean elections, freedom 
of association, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, 
a liberal component index that includes indicators on equality before the law 
as well as an individual liberty index, a judicial constraints on the executive 
index and a legislative constraints on the executive index. Besides the electoral 
and liberal principles of democracy, the V ‑Dem project also measures the par‑
ticipatory, deliberative and egalitarian principles of democracy. The egalitarian 
component index includes indicators on equal protection, equal access and 
equal distribution of resources. The participatory component index includes 
data on civil society participation, the direct popular vote, local government 
and regional government. The deliberative component index includes informa‑
tion on reasoned justification, common good, respect for counterarguments, 
range of consultation and an engaged society. Approximately half of the data is 
obtained from factual information available in official documents: constitutions 
and government records. The other half is based on the subjective assessments 
of country experts. Slovenia is among the top 10–20% of countries in the liberal 
democracy index, which classifies it as liberal democracy with some shortcom‑
ings. Montenegro is in the range of 40–50% of the analysed countries, along 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia, and is classified 
as an electoral autocracy. On the other five principles of democracy, Slovenia 
also scores better than Montenegro. Slovenia scores highest on the participa‑
tory component index where it ranks 4th and lowest on the electoral democracy 
index where it ranks 29th. Montenegro also scores highest on participatory 
component index being ranked 46th and lowest on the electoral component 
index, where it was ranked 107th (Lührmann et al. 2019).
The Polity IV project forms a composite index of regime types and monitors 
changes to regimes. It measures key qualities of executive recruitment, con‑
straints on executive authority and political competition and changes in the 
institutionalized qualities of governing authority. However, the data includes 
information only on the institutions of the central government and the political 
groups within the authority. Polity IV looks at the same time at the qualities of 
democracy and autocratic authority in governing institutions. This forms an 
index of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocra‑
cies through mixed and incoherent authority regimes to fully institutionalized 
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democracies. Index ranges from –10 – a hereditary monarchy to +10 – a con‑
solidated democracy. The regime of the country is defined based on the score 
of the index: 10 is a full democracy, 6 to 9 a democracy, 1 to 5 an open anocracy, 
0 to –5 a closed anocracy and –6 to –10 an autocracy (Polity IV 2018). Both 
Slovenia and Montenegro are evaluated as democracies. Slovenia scores 10 as 
a full democracy while Montenegro scores 9.
The Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit measures the state 
of democracy in a composed index of weighted averages, based on the answers 
to 60 indicators in five different categories: the electoral process and pluralism, 
the functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil 
liberties. Most answers to the indicators are provided by experts, with some 
taken from public opinion surveys. The answers are standardised on a scale from 
0 to 1. The democracy index scores are calculated from the average values of the 
five category indices and rounded to two decimal places. Economic living stand‑
ards are not included as one of the indicators of the democracy index. Based 
on their ranking, countries are categorised in one of four regime types: 1) full 
democracies, where civil liberties and basic political freedoms are reinforced by 
the political culture, the country has a valid system of governmental checks and 
balances, an independent judiciary, an adequately functioning government and 
a diverse and independent media; 2) flawed democracies; where elections are 
free and fair and basic civil liberties are respected with a few issues, but which 
have an underdeveloped political culture, low levels of political participation 
and issues in the functioning of governance; 3) hybrid regimes, where irregulari‑
ties are present in elections, government puts pressure on political opponents, 
and which feature non ‑independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, the 
harassment of media, anaemic rule of law processes, an underdeveloped politi‑
cal culture, low levels of political participation and issues in the functioning of 
government and 4) authoritarian regimes, where political pluralism has almost 
vanished, infringements and abuses of civil liberties are common, there is an 
absence of free and fair elections, the media is state ‑owned, the judiciary is not 
independent, and there is censorship and suppression of government criticism 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Slovenia scores 7.50 on the democracy 
index which classifies it as a flawed democracy. It scores the lowest on the in‑
dex of political culture and highest on the index of the electoral process and 
pluralism (9.58). Montenegro scores 5.74 and is classified as a hybrid regime. 
It also scores lowest on the index of political culture and highest on the index 
of civil liberties (6.76).
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) measures two indexes: 
a Status index that ranks countries according to the quality of their democracy 
under the rule of law and social market economic practices and a Governance 
index that ranks countries according to the quality of the leadership’s political 
management performance. Country experts evaluate the extent to which differ‑
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ent criteria have been met by responding to a set of questions in a qualitative 
way that is later standardised into numerical ratings from one, the lowest value 
to ten, the highest. The Status index is composed of two indexes: 1) the state of 
political transformation which is assessed based on 5 criteria: a) stateness – the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force and the basic administrative structure, state 
identity and non ‑interference of religious dogmas, b) political participation ex‑
pressed in free and fair elections, effective power to govern, rights of association 
and freedom of expression, c) the rule of law including the separation of powers, 
an independent judiciary, civil rights and the prosecution of abuse of office, d) 
stability: the performance and commitment of democratic institutions and e) 
political and social integration which includes the party system and interest 
groups but also measures social capital and the approval of democratic norms 
and procedures, and 2) the state of economic transformation index measured in 
7 criteria: a) the level of socioeconomic development, b) the organization of the 
market and competition including market ‑based competition, anti ‑monopoly 
policies and the liberalization of foreign trade and banking system, c) currency 
and price stability, d) private property including property rights and private 
enterprise, e) a welfare regime which includes social safety nets and equality 
of opportunity, f) economic performance and g) sustainability expressed in 
terms of the environmental and education policies. The Governance index is 
measured by five additional criteria: a) the level of difficulty calculated from 
three qualitative and three quantitative indicators of structural constraints, dif‑
ficult conditions and scarcity of resources, b) the steering capability measured 
in prioritization, implementation and policy learning, c) resource efficiency 
expressed in the wise and effective use of resources, d) consensus building by 
building the broadest possible consensus and e) international cooperation 
seen as reliable work with external supporters and neighbouring states. Aside 
from the answers of country expert, a second country expert reviews the scores 
(BTI 2018). Slovenia ranks sixth on the Status index and tenth on the Govern‑
ance index, while Montenegro scores 20th on the Status index and 17th on the 
Governance index.
Regardless of which index we use, we may notice that they include various 
dimensions and sub ‑dimensions. The composition of indexes is thus complex 
and the effect of one individual sub ‑dimension on the whole index is fairly 
minimal. Montenegro scores below Slovenia on all indexes, but usually on 
the sub ‑dimensions of indexes which demonstrate higher levels of quality of 
democracy, the same applies to Slovenia. Similarly, on those indexes where 
Slovenia demonstrates lower levels of quality of democracy the same could be 
said for Montenegro. It seems that the same trends apply to both Slovenia and 
Montenegro, except that Montenegro needs more time to improve its level of 
democracy on separate dimensions. At the same time, we may also notice that 
some indexes evaluate both Slovenia and Montenegro quite high, leaving little 
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 16 (2020) 3 579
space for improvement (e.g. the Polity IV index) while others rank both coun‑
tries quite low, where it seems both will have to further work on improving the 
quality of their democracy (e.g. the V ‑Dem project index).
Table 1: Overview of different indexes of the quality of democracy2
Index Slovenia Montenegro
Nations in transit, 2020; values from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the lowest level of democratic 





Electoral Process 6.50 4.25
Civil Society 6.00 5.25




and Independence 6.00 3.50
Corruption 5.25 3.00
Democracy Score 5.93 3.86
V-Dem project, 2019; rank and score from 0 to 1, with 1 representing higher quality
Liberal Democracy 
Index 19/ 0.773 97/ 0.349
Electoral 
Democracy Index 29/ 0.824 107/ 0.456
Liberal Component 
Index 7/ 0.975 82/ 0.699
Egalitarian 
Component Index 17/ 0.899 58/ 0.731
Participatory 
Component Index 4/ 0.748 46/ 0.605
Deliberative 
Component Index 27/ 0.900 98/0.663
Polity IV, 2014; scores between -10 to 10, where 10 is full democracy, 6 to 9 democracy, 1 to 5 open 
anocracy, -5 to 0 closed anocracy and -10 to -6 autocracy
Authority trends 10, since 1991 9, since 2006
2 One additional index of the quality of democracy is the Democracy Barometer Index which is built upon 
liberal and participatory ideas of democracy. It is based on three fundamental principles: freedom, 
equality and control. The Democracy Barometer, unlike Freedom House, the V-Dem project, the Polity 
Project and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, does not rely heavily on expert opinion and rather 
uses factual data and aggregated survey data (Merkel et al. 2018). Unfortunately, not all indicators are 
available for all countries. For Montenegro, we only have available data for the principle of equality 
where Montenegro scores behind Slovenia. For this reason, we did not include the Democracy Barometer 
Index in the analysis.
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The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index, 2018; rank and scores between 0 to 10, where 0 to 
4 are authoritarian regimes, 4.01 to 6 hybrid regimes, 6.01 to 8 flawed democracies and 8.01 to 10 full 
democracies
Electoral process 





Political culture 6.25 4.38
Civil liberties 8.24 6.76
Regime type 36/ 7.50 81/ 5.74
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, 2018, rank and score between 1 and 10 where 10 is the 
highest value





Governance Index 10/6.78 17/6.49
Source: BTI 2018; Economic Intelligence Unit 2019; Lührmann et al. 2019; Nations in Transit 2020; 
Polity IV 2018.
Various indexes that measure the quality of democracy show higher scores and 
better ratings for Slovenia. Regardless of which index we take into account or 
on which dimension of quality of democracy we focus, Slovenia seem to reach 
higher levels of quality of democracy.
The quality of democracy in Slovenia and Montenegro: 
“Subjective” measures
Since most of the composed indexes of the quality of democracy are predomi‑
nantly based on objective factors, we also looked at public opinion data on sat‑
isfaction with democracy, the government and certain other areas (see Table 2). 
Here the results are not so straight forward. Slovenians trusted their political 
parties and parliament more compared to Montenegro only in 2008. In 2018, 
the situation was reversed. Citizens of Montenegro had a higher level of trust 
in parliament, political parties and trade unions and greater confidence in their 
government, parliament and political parties. They also had greater trust in the 
European Parliament and confidence in the European Union in 2018. On the 
other hand, Slovenians had greater confidence in environmental organisations 
and the social security system in 2008, as well as in 2018. Trust in the armed 
forces dropped between 2008 and 2018 in Slovenia, while in Montenegro, 
trust in the armed forces increased. With the economic and financial crises 
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from 2008 onwards, Slovenia also experienced political crises with a string of 
early elections in 2011, 2014 and 2018 and new political parties that repeat‑
edly disappointed the voters. This is apparently reflected in dropping trust and 
confidence in political institutions not only at the national, but also at the EU 
level. By contrast, in Montenegro where the ruling party since independence 
is a successor party to the former Montenegrin Communist Party, trust levels 
in political institutions are higher than in Slovenia.
Slovenians are on the other hand more satisfied with the state of their de‑
mocracy, find their country to be more democratically governed and are more 
satisfied with the way democracy works in Slovenia. However, the differences 
are only minor. At the same time, it seems that for the citizens of Montenegro 
in general democracy as a political system has a better image. In their view, the 
democratic system for governing their country is doing better than the system 
in Slovenia in the opinion of the Slovenians, and Montenegrins are more satis‑
fied with how their political system functions, believing to a greater extent that 
their political system allows people like them to have an influence on politics.
It seems as though we have some contradictory results. The objective meas‑
ures of the quality of democracy rate Slovenia higher compared to Montenegro. 
In addition, according to public opinion, Slovenians express greater satisfac‑
tion with democracy in general. But when evaluating the performance of the 
political system and individual institutions, Montenegrins are more satisfied. 
This difference between Montenegro and Slovenia was not present only in 
2008, which we could explain in terms of Montenegrin satisfaction as a result 
of enthusiasm over the change of political system and recently won independ‑
ence. The difference is even more obvious in 2018, more than 10 years after the 
emergence of an independent Montenegro.
This shows us that by only considering the various indexes of the quality 
of democracy we may not have an in ‑depth view in the real state of democracy. 
While various indexes on the quality of democracy are good for ranking coun‑
tries and for monitoring progress they do not give us information on where the 
shortcomings of the quality of democracy are or why they exist. For this reason, 
we believe case studies on particular policy areas such as the party system, the 
composition of government, social and defence policy, interest groups and Eu‑
ropeanisation processes should give us a better view of where the differences in 
the quality of democracy lie in specific areas and perhaps also which processes 
and factors have contributed to these differences.
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Table 2: Subjective measures of the quality of democracy
Subjective measures of dimensions of the quality of democracy, EVS, 2008 and 2018; mean 
values
Variable Year Slovenia Montenegro
How good is it to have a democratic political system to 
govern this country? 
(1- very good, 4- very bad) 
2008 1.81 1.72
2018 1.65 1.60
Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any 
other form of government (1- agree strongly, 4- disagree 
strongly) 
2008 1.92 1.76
How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed democratically? (1- not at all important, 
10- absolutely important) 
2018 8.12 8.05
How satisfied are you with democracy? (1- very satisfied, 
4- not at all satisfied) 2008 2.55 2.73
And how democratically is this country being governed 
today? (1- not at all democratic, 10- completely 
democratic) 
2018 5.38 5.18
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in your country? (00- extremely 
dissatisfied, 10 – extremely satisfied) 
2018 4.30 4.16
People have different view about the system for 
governing this country. How well things are going? 
(1- very bad, 10- very good) 
2008 4.73 5.25
How satisfied are you with how the political system is 
functioning in your country these days? (1- not satisfied 
at all, 10- completely satisfied) 
2018 4.13 5.05
How much would you say that the political system in 
your country allows people like you to have an influence 
on politics? (1- not at all, 5- a great deal) 
2018 1.89 2.03
Confidence in government (1- a great deal, 4- none at all) 
2008 2.70 2.77
2018 3.10 2.79
Confidence in: parliament (1- a great deal, 4- none at all) 
2008 2.60 2.80
2018 3.07 2.80
Trust in national parliament (00- no trust at all, 10- 
complete trust) 2018 3.58 4.16




Trust in political parties (00- no trust at all, 10- complete 
trust) 2018 2.70 3.07




Trust in the European Parliament (00- no trust at all, 
10- complete trust) 2018 3.84 4.80
Confidence in trade unions (1- a great deal, 4- none at all) 
2008 2.51 2.97
2018 3.03 2.95
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Subjective measures of dimensions of the quality of democracy, EVS, 2008 and 2018; mean 
values
Variable Year Slovenia Montenegro
Confidence in environmental organizations (1- a great 
deal, 4- none at all) 
2008 2.22 2.68
2018 2.49 2.72
Confidence in: social security system (1- a great deal, 
4- none at all) 
2008 2.49 2.55
2018 2.61 2.74




Source: EVS 2016; EVS 2018; ESS 2018.
Methodology and content of the special issue
Despite the common history of Slovenia and Montenegro between 1945 and 
1991 and the fact that both are fairly small countries, the quality of democracy 
in both countries differs today. There may be several reasons for the different 
paths and speeds of development and transition in both countries. The factors 
that have influenced successful democratic transition probably also have an 
effect on the current quality of democracy these countries have achieved.
This special issue on (de)democratisation in Slovenia and Montenegro 
answers questions about the quality of democracy in these two countries by 
looking at the specific areas and factors that were on the one hand influenced 
by the respective processes of democratic transition and on the other, which 
still contribute to the current state of democracy in both countries.
We will point out a few differences, recognised in the literature, that might 
have contributed to the changes in the quality of democracy that are still no‑
ticeable today. Some of the factors that might have had an impact on the level 
of the quality of democracy include socio ‑economic variables, differences in 
ethnic structure, the strength of civil society, the characteristics of the transi‑
tion processes, constitutional choices, the electoral system and external factors 
(Fink Hafner – Hafner Fink 2009).
Year of independence. While Slovenia decided to seek full independence in the 
early 1990s, Montenegro established, together with Serbia, the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and gained its independence only in 2006 (see Table 3). The pro‑
cess of transition did not start before 1997 which meant a delay in transitional 
elections and democratisation (Fink Hafner – Hafner Fink 2009). We consider 
this factor in all the articles of the special issue, because the total period since 
independence allowed more time for development in Slovenia.
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Political system. Democratic transitions are less successful in presidential 
systems and fragmented party system (Przeworski et al. 1996). Although Slo‑
venia and Montenegro both have a parliamentary system, it is characteristic of 
Montenegro that it has a predominant party system. The former Montenegrin 
Communist Party renamed itself as the Democratic Party of Socialist and has 
continued to win national elections since independence. It has control over ac‑
cess to public resources and decision ‑making and has reinforced a hierarchical 
political culture in the country and a top ‑down approach to decision making 
(Komar – Živković 2016). Elena Nacevska and Nemanja Stankov (2020) fill the 
gap regarding the differences in the democratization processes between Slove‑
nia and Montenegro with a focus on party system development and changes from 
the ‘old ruling elite’ to the establishment of a multi ‑party system. With special 
emphasis on electoral rules and party system developments, they outline the 
patterns of party competition and party system development, between two dif‑
ferent political contexts and link these processes to stages of democratisation.
Ethnic structure. A more homogenous ethnic structure contributes to a more 
successful transition (Gasiorovski – Power 1998) although ethnic heterogeneity 
does not necessarily prevent a peaceful transition (Fink Hafner – Hafner Fink 
2009). Slovenia is more ethnically homogeneous, while in Montenegro more 
ethnicities coexist, currently without major conflicts. While Montenegrins are 
the largest ethnic community they do not represent an absolute majority. Alenka 
Krašovec and Nemanja Batričević (2020) consider the dynamics of govern‑
ment formation in Slovenia and Montenegro since their formal introduction 
of multiparty systems (1990–2018) in order to identify numerous factors that 
contribute to the formation and durability of governments, with a special focus 
on the effect of party cleavages and party systems characteristics in general.
Civil Society. A vibrant civil society and interest group system that is involved 
in policymaking is an important internal factor supporting democracy (Fink 
Hafner – Hafner Fink 2009; Linz – Stepan 1996). Slovenia has very vibrant 
civil society and interest group system which actually started to develop in the 
1980s (Kolarič et al. 2002; Vandor et al. 2017). Unlike in Slovenia, Montenegro 
entered the era of pluralism without being able to develop a participative cul‑
ture beforehand. Its civil society and interest group system is fairly young and 
dependent on external funding. There was no opposition civil society that could 
challenge the old elites at the first multi ‑party elections (Fink Hafner – Hafner 
Fink 2009). Olivera Komar and Meta Novak (2020) are in particularly interested 
in the effects of the democratic transition on the organizational development 
of the interest group system and their characteristics in Slovenia and Monte‑
negro. They compare the frequency of contacts between interest groups and 
decision ‑makers as an indicator of the openness of the political system and the 
inclusion of members in the internal decision ‑making of interest groups and 
argue that established links between interest groups and decision ‑makers and 
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the inclusion of members in interest groups activities contribute to the qual‑
ity of democracy. In the analyses they use comparative data gathered through 
a comparative interest groups survey in Slovenia and Montenegro that uses 
the same research instrument and a similar sampling process, so as to provide 
comparative data.
External effects. International circumstances have an impact on the devel‑
opment and maintenance of democracy (Fink Hafner – Hafner Fink 2009; 
Przeworski et al. 1996). Slovenia’s earlier independence and better economic 
position also facilitated their membership of the European Union. Slovenia has 
been an EU member since 2004 while Montenegro has been a candidate coun‑
try since 2010. Since 2010, Montenegro has been called many times “a leader” 
in the EU accession negotiations when is compared to the rest of the region 
that has not yet joined the EU. It is also true that Slovenia received its status 
as a candidate country six years after gaining independence (in 1997) while 
Montenegro was made a candidate country after four years of independence. 
Gordana Djurović and Damjan Lajh (2020) describe the relationship between 
Slovenia and Montenegro on the one hand, and the European Union on the 
other. Both countries held a special status and relationship with the European 
Communities earlier than most other socialist countries. Economic and social 
interactions with the EU and its member ‑states were thus part of Slovenian 
and Montenegrin life even prior to their independence. Europeanization as 
a “practical” integration with the EU was closely linked in these two countries 
to the processes of liberalisation in the economy, society and politics as well as to 
the processes of democratic transition. The authors investigate the evolution 
of the relationship between these two countries and the EU.
The economic situation. The economic situation was already different in these 
two countries while they were both part of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was economi‑
cally the most developed of all the former Yugoslav republics so its starting point 
for the democratic transition was better. After all, economic stagnation and 
a weak economy do not contribute to democratisation (Fink Hafner – Hafner 
Fink 2009; Przeworski et al. 1996). Even today, GDP per capita is much higher 
in Slovenia. However, economic development does not generate democracies in 
and of itself. Other factors need to be present as well (Przeworski 2002). In this 
special issue, we focus in particular on the effects of the economic situation on 
social policy. Maša Filipovič Hrast, Uglješa Janković and Tatjana Rakar (2020) 
examine the diverse developments in the field of social policy over the last three 
decades. They describe the position and main challenges of the transition of 
the two countries in the 1990s in relation to developments and changes in the 
field of social policy, by analysing the main policy changes in the core fields of 
social policy, such as the labour market and social assistance, family policy and 
old age policy. In their analysis, they also include a discussion of the structural 
pressures on social policy, in particular the economic and social situation of 
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the two countries, and compare the effects of GDP growth, social stratification, 
the risk of poverty, social protection expenditure and the unemployment rate.
The presence of war. Peace supports democratic developments and is a neces‑
sary condition for a successful transition to democracy (Fink Hafner – Hafner 
Fink 2009). Neither of these two countries experienced a long war within their 
territory in the 1990s. Slovenia only experienced a ten ‑day war. Montenegro was 
indirectly involved in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
Neighbouring countries. Slovenia’s geographical position, bordering two more 
established democracies in Italy and Austria, influenced the culture and their 
view on free market economies. Having a border with a democratic country has 
a positive effect on democratic developments (Gasiorowski – Power 1998). The 
level of democracy in one country interacts with the level of democracy in each 
neighbouring country (Huntington 1993: 7). On the other hand, Montenegro 
bordered mostly on the other republics of Yugoslavia. Its only external border 
was with communist Albania. Iztok Prezelj, Olivera Ignjac and Anja Kolak 
(2020) explain how democratization of the field of national defence was ex‑
tremely important since national defence represented one of the cornerstones 
of the old socialist and communist regimes. The newly independent countries 
needed to establish themselves in relation towards neighbouring countries by 
building their own independent system of defence. For Slovenia, the national 
defence system was challenged already during the first, 10‑day long, war of inde‑
pendence. The national defence systems of both countries were a result of their 
socialist past, but then gradual democratization led to drastic improvements 
in the quality of democracy in the field of national defence. A more democratic 
national defence system enabled membership of NATO, the appointment of 
civilian defence ministers and the inclusion of civilian defence experts, a reduc‑
tion in the total number of soldiers and the defence budget, the establishment 
of professional armed forces with a high representation of women and the op‑
portunity to act as a security provider in foreign missions.
The present differences between Slovenia and Montenegro could have con‑
tributed to the currently different levels of the quality of democracy in both 
countries. At the same time, it is also possible that some of the differences are 
not the cause but rather a consequence of the different levels of the quality of 
democracy in these two countries.
In this special issue the articles follow the same framework methodology 
of comparative research. Each article compares the situation in Slovenia and 
Montenegro by comparing arguments, and the development and characteris‑
tics of both countries. In general, the time frame of the analysis extends from 
the 1980s to the modern day. In their respective articles, the authors present 
an overview of the development of the particular area and its current situation. 
The analysis is predominantly descriptive because at the current stage we argue 
it is necessary to first present the scope of development and the contribution 
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to the quality of democracy from different areas. Although some areas are rich 
in comparative studies, in other we still lack analysis, especially when we want 
to compare two small countries with a similar history that took rather differ‑
ent paths towards transition. Where available, the authors also used empirical, 
comparable data. However, the data is largely comparable in one area but not 
available to compare it further across different areas. In this special issue, we 
want to achieve three major goals:
1. To provide an overview of the process of democratic transition in a particular 
area.
 a. In particular, how did the changes arrived at during the process 
 of democratic transition affect the development in the specific area?
2. To evaluate the current quality of democracy in particular areas.
 a. What is the current quality of democracy in specific areas and how did 
 it change?
 b. Do we currently witness a better quality of democracy or are we 
 starting to notice a process of (de)democratization?
3. To compare the process of democratic transition and the quality of democ‑
racy in particular areas in Slovenia and Montenegro
Table 3: Factors explaining the differences in the quality 
of democracy in Slovenia and Montenegro
Factors Slovenia Montenegro
Year of independence 1991 2006
Political system Parliamentary system Predominant party system
Electoral system Proportional system Proportional system, closed lists
Ethnic homogeneity of 
population.
83.1% Slovenes, 2% Serbs, 1.8% 
Croats, 1.6% Bosniaks, 0.3% Italians, 
2.2% Other,, 8.9% Unspecified (in 
2002)
44.5% Montenegrins; 28.7% Serbs 
8.6% Bosniaks, 4.9% Albanians, 
0.9% Croats, 13.6% Others ( in 2011)
Number of active CSOs / 
1000 citizens 3.62 1.69
EU membership status Member country since 2004 Candidate country since 2010
Economic development 
(GDP per capita 2018) €20,170 €6,230
Presence of domestic 




Italy, Austria, Hungary Albania
Membership of  NATO 2004 2017
Source: MONSTAT, 2011, SURS, 2002; More-Hollerweger et al. 2019; Eurostat, 2019.
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 a. In what ways were the effects of the democratic transition on a specific 
 area similar in Slovenia and Montenegro and in what ways were they 
 different?
 b. How different or equal is the quality of democracy in a specific area in 
 Slovenia and Montenegro?
The results produced by these three major goals will produce the first compara‑
tive study of the process of democratic transition and democracy in Slovenia 
and Montenegro.
Conclusion
This article has examined the definition and different indexes of the quality of 
democracy and presented their values for Slovenia and Montenegro. We can 
conclude that scholars have developed a number of composed indexes that in‑
clude various dimensions of the quality of democracy. Although high scores on 
one dimension normally also contribute to higher scores on other dimensions 
there are also some limits to this. It is almost impossible to score the highest 
values for all dimensions. Nevertheless, Slovenia scores higher in comparison 
to Montenegro on all indices of the quality of democracy. Although all the ob‑
jective indexes show a higher level of quality of democracy for Slovenia than 
for Montenegro, we can also find some similarities in the quality of democracy 
between the two countries. Slovenia and Montenegro in the majority of cases 
performed better (or worse) on the same components of the indexes. It seems 
like that the same trends apply to Slovenia and Montenegro, but that Monte‑
negro needs more time to improve its level of democracy. While the composed 
indexes that include various dimensions and indicators are very useful for 
ranking the countries and monitoring their progress they do not tell us much 
about which the weak points of the quality of democracy are and why these exist.
By also compering the level of satisfaction with democracy in public opinion 
data we show that subjective measures of quality of democracy are not necessar‑
ily dependent on objective measures. All, the indexes of the quality of democracy, 
regardless of how they are composed, have limitations and do not always tell 
us the whole story. While objectively the government can propose policies and 
processes of high democratic quality, citizens may still object to these policies 
and approaches. Although Slovenians are more satisfied with the state of their 
democracy, find their country to be more democratically governed and are more 
satisfied with the way democracy works in Slovenia, Montenegrins in compari‑
son to Slovenians believe that the democratic system for governing their country 
is doing better, are more satisfied with how the political system is functioning 
and believe to a greater extent that their political system allows people like them 
to have an influence on politics. The enthusiasm for the new political system in 
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Montenegro has still not decreased after more than 10 years of independence. 
The level of confidence in political institutions has even increased over the ten 
years of independence. On the other hand, various political crises in Slovenia 
are reflected in the low levels of trust in institutions and greater dissatisfaction 
with the political system.
In this special issue, we will thus offer a case study approach to the assess‑
ment of quality of democracy and limit ourselves in each article to a specific 
area relevant to the quality of democracy such as the party system, government 
composition, the interest groups system, Europeanisation processes, and social 
and national defence policies.
The findings are compared between Slovenia and Montenegro, two former 
Yugoslav republics whose processes of democratic transition have been and 
remain different. In the future, a similar approach might be used to study the 
quality of democracy by including other areas, countries or entire regions (e.g. 
Western Europe) in the analysis. We encourage other scholars to continue to 
investigate these processes and issues by expending the scope to include other 
new democracies and geographical areas.
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